

William Kaufmann

↳ Wrote in 1950 "Limited War", a paper that argued for the expansion of Western European conventional armies instead of a reliance on nuclear weapons to forestall an invasion by the Soviet Union.

"Countervalue" refers to targeting civilian infrastructure (cities, dams, bridges)

"Deterrence" is a strategy by which governments threaten an immense retaliation if attacked, such that aggressors are deterred if they do not want to suffer great damage as a result of an aggressive action.

↳ The weakness of this approach is that 1. it presumes a rational adversary and does not deter the suicidal or psychotic opponent, and 2. encourages an arms race.

"Appeasement" is a policy of settling quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly dangerous. (in political circles, it has become synonymous for cowardice).

↳ The term is most often applied to Neville Chamberlain and Adlai Stevenson.

"Peace through Strength" is the doctrine that military strength is a primary/necessary component of peace. It is the opposite of a policy of appeasement.

↳ This doctrine is a major justification cited for large militaries, and also served as the primary motivation behind the Cold War doctrine of mutually assured destruction.

"Counterforce"

Proposed in 1960 by William Kaufmann. A counterforce strategy avoided Soviet population centers while targeting its first volley of nuclear weapons at Soviet bomber bases, submarine posts and other military targets. By its' avoidance of civilians, it differed from Dulles's retaliation.

↳ His hope was that this limited initial response would bring the war to a resolution shy of annihilation.

↳ Counterforce targeting undermines the theory of nuclear deterrence, in that both sides are more likely to believe in the possibility of a first strike attack, possibly preempting conflict. It is a prescription for conducting strikes after fighting has begun.

"Fail-Deadly"

A concept in nuclear military strategy which encouraged deterrence by guaranteeing an immediate, automatic and overwhelming response to an attack.

↳ An example may be found imbedded in second strike strategy, wherein following a first strike, the policies and procedures controlling the retaliatory second strike will authorize launch even of the existing command structure had been neutralized.

↳ For this to be an effective deterrent, it is necessary for ones opponents to have foreknowledge of the plan. The Soviet Union's plan was codenamed 'Perimetr' and relied upon submarines for the retaliatory strike.

"Nuclear peace" argues that under some circumstances nuclear weapons can induce stability and decrease the chances of crisis escalation.

↳ In particular, nuclear weapons are said to have induced stability during the Cold War, when both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. possessed mutual second-strike retaliation capability, eliminating the possibility of nuclear victory for either side. Proponents of the nuclear peace argue that controlled nuclear proliferation may be beneficial for inducing stability. Critics of the nuclear peace argue that nuclear proliferation not only increases the chance of inter-state nuclear conflict, but increases the chances of nuclear material falling into the hands of non-state groups who are free from the threat of nuclear retaliation.

↳ The major debate on this issue has been between Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealist theory in international relations, and Scott Sagan, a leading proponent of organizational theories in international politics. Waltz generally argues that "more may be better," contending that new nuclear states will use their acquired nuclear capabilities to deter threats and preserve peace. Sagan argues that "more will be worse", since new nuclear states often lack adequate organizational controls over their new weapons, which makes for a high risk of either deliberate or accidental nuclear war, or nuclear theft by terrorists.

"Proxy war" is a war which results when two powers use third parties as substitutes for fighting each other directly. The hope is that by striking ones opponent through these third parties (nations, terrorist groups), they can weaken their adversary within reverting to full-fledged war.

"Brinkmanship" is the practice of pushing a dangerous situation to the verge of disaster in order to achieve the most advantageous outcome. This maneuver succeeds by forcing the opposition to back down and make concessions. Done through diplomatic means after creating the impression that one is willing to use extreme methods rather than concede.

↳ The dangers of brinkmanship is evident. In order for it to be effective, the threats used must be credible and are continuously escalated. This runs the risk of losing control.

"Military-Industrial Complex"

Commonly used to refer to policy relationships between governments, national armed forces, and industrial support they obtain from the commercial sector in political approval for research, development, production, use, and support for military training, weapons, equipment, and facilities within the national defense and security policy. It is a type of iron triangle.

↳ Eisenhower initially used the term military-industrial-congressional complex, and thus indicated the essential role that the United States Congress plays in the propagation of the military industry. But, it is said, that the president chose to strike the word congressional in order to placate members of the legislative branch of the federal government.

↳ It involves a class of military, business, and political leaders, driven by mutual interests, were the real leaders of the state, and were effectively beyond democratic control.

"Stability-Instability Paradox"

Although nuclear weapons contribute to stability at a strategic level, they can encourage smaller instances of instability that are not believed likely to blossom into full-scale warfare.

↳ Best exemplified by the small wars (small relative to the possibility of a nuclear exchange) that sprang up during the Cold War, such as Vietnam and Korea.

Cold War, 1950-1989 Overarching Political Science Theory Applicable to Aspects of the Conflict (page 1 of 2)

Security Dilemma

Decapitation strike

The Madman theory was a primary characteristic of the foreign policy conducted by Richard Nixon.

↳ His administration attempted to make the leaders of other countries think Nixon was mad, and that his behavior was irrational and volatile. Fearing an unpredictable American response, leaders of hostile Communist Bloc nations would avoid provoking the United States.
↳ The administration employed the "Madman strategy" (as it was later dubbed by Haldeman) to force the North Vietnamese government to negotiate a peace to end the Vietnam War. Along the same lines, American diplomats (Henry Kissinger in particular) portrayed 1970 incursion into Cambodia as a symptom of Nixon's supposed instability.
↳ Nixon's use of the strategy during the Vietnam War was problematic

"Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence"

This is a document produced in 1995 as a "Terms of Reference" by the Department of Defense.
↳ The article is notable not only for its significance in outlining current United States military strategy and foreign policy, but also for its clear advocacy/support of ambiguity regarding "what is permitted" for other nations and its endorsement of "irrationality", or more precisely, the perception thereof, as an important tool in deterrence and foreign policy.

↳ The document claims that the capacity of the United States in exercising deterrence would be hurt by portraying U.S. leaders as fully rational and cool-headed, stating that "The fact that some elements may appear to be potentially 'out of control' can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts in the minds of an adversary's decision makers. This essential sense of fear is the working force of deterrence. That the U.S. may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be part of the national persona we project to all adversaries."

“Operation Dropshot”

The United States Department of Defense code-name for an internal document describing a possible offensive, nuclear and conventional war with the USSR in the Cold War.

- ↳ At the time the US nuclear arsenal was limited in size, based mostly in the United States, and depended on bombers to be delivered. Dropshot included mission profiles that would use 300 nuclear bombs and 29,000 high-explosive bombs on 200 targets in 100 cities and towns to wipe out 85% of the Soviet Union's industrial potential at a single stroke. Between 75 and 100 of the 300 nuclear weapons would be used to destroy Soviet combat aircraft on the ground.
- ↳ The scenario was devised prior to the development of ICBMs, and even included the note that the entire plan would be invalidated if rocketry became a cheap and effective means of delivering a nuclear weapon.

Minimal deterrence involves the ability to respond to a nuclear attack with a minimal nuclear counterstrike.

- ↳ In contrast to mutual assured destruction, the counterstrike would not have the ability to destroy the attacker, but rather is intended to severely damage the attacker in order to deter an attack. It appears to be the nuclear posture that the People's Republic of China maintains toward the United States as well as the nuclear policy of India and Pakistan.
- ↳ Minimum deterrence is the capability of inflicting damage upon enemies with the use of a small arsenal of nuclear weapons. The state with minimum deterrence capability could in effect deter other nations (possibly armed with nuclear weapons themselves) from aggression. A state usually obtains minimum deterrence capability after gaining a credible second strike capability.
- ↳ Minimum deterrence is also the policy of having only nuclear weapons to cause significant damage to the other side and not cause a nuclear winter.
- ↳ Proposed by Scott D. Sagan

Minimum Credible Deterrence is the principle on which India's nuclear doctrine is based.

- ↳ It underlines no first use with a second strike capability, and falls under minimal deterrence as opposed to mutually assured destruction

The 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations is the current US doctrine on when and under which circumstances to use nuclear weapons.

- ↳ The doctrine cites 8 reasons under which field commanders can ask for permission to use nuclear weapons:
 - An enemy using or threatening to use WMD against US, multinational, or alliance forces or civilian populations.
 - To prevent an imminent biological attack
 - To attack enemy WMD or its deep hardened bunkers containing WMD that could be used to target US or its allies.
 - To stop potentially overwhelming conventional enemy forces.
 - To rapidly end a war on favorable US terms.
 - To make sure US and international operations are successful.
 - To show US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter enemy from using WMDs.
 - To react to enemy-supplied WMD use by proxies against US and international forces or civilians.

Major powers create and fund international organizations

- Spoken purpose: mutual defense and to promote peace
- Hidden purpose: to keep other countries allied with them and to prevent national 'defections' to the other side.

Cold War, 1950-1989

Overarching Political Science Theory Applicable to Aspects of the Conflict

(page 2 of 2)

“Dead Hand” Strike (aka Fail-Deadly Deterrence)

This was designed in fear of a decapitation strike.

- ↳ The Soviet Union had established an automated system wherein if someone does not input a specific code at regular intervals, the system will launch a second strike on predetermined targets.
- ↳ In place in the 1960s, and submarine-based in the 1980s.
- ↳ Game theorists have argued that, if an enemy believed they could successfully defeat one's command and control system in a first strike, they would attempt to do so. The USSR therefore took steps to ensure that nuclear retaliation (and hence deterrence) remained possible even if its leadership was destroyed in a surprise attack.